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If the trend continues, the voting loyalty of southern
white Democrats to House candidates will soon be on a
par with that toward Democratic presidential candidates
(Stanley 1988: 77). 
In the long run, however, the realignment appeared cer-
tain to continue to work its way steadily downward
through the political levels—from presidential voting to
statewide voting to local voting . . . (Sundquist 1983: 375).
Republican gains in the South have come slowly andinconsistently. The GOP became the party of choicein presidential elections in the Rim South in the
1950s and achieved similar status in the Deep South a
decade later. In 1972 for the first time in the modern era,
Republicans swept the South’s Electoral College votes, a pat-
tern that, with one exception, recurred throughout the
1980s and again in 2000.1
Yet for 30 years after Barry Goldwater became the first
GOP presidential nominee to win the Deep South, carrying
seven Republicans into Congress on his coattails, southern-
ers voted heavily for conservative Republican and inde-
pendent presidential candidates, while returning large
numbers of Democrats to Congress and state legislatures.
Then, in 1994, southern white support for Republican can-
didates surged to record levels enabling the GOP to achieve
majority status in the region’s U.S. Senate and House dele-
gations, and make substantial gains in southern state legis-
latures (Black and Black 2002). 
This study seeks to identify the voters who deserted
Democratic congressional candidates in 1994, and deter-
mine whether this profile continued as part of the sustained
GOP congressional majority in the South after 1994. Was
there an across-the-board shift to the GOP or were some
voters particularly attracted to Republican candidates? Con-
temporary analyses focused on angry white males and
Christian fundamentalists as fueling the GOP upsurge. More
generally, the 1994 results were interpreted as a rebuke to
President Clinton and his health care initiatives. After iden-
tifying those whites most prone to change to the GOP, we
offer reasons behind the shift. Since Democratic defectors
have been overwhelmingly white, we focus on that group
and what happened in 1994 and subsequent elections.
THE SETTING
Before 1998 the president’s party invariably lost ground
in mid-term elections. That alone augured for GOP gains in
1994. Republicans had made modest gains in the South in
1962, 1966, and 1978, the three most recent mid-term elec-
tions when a Democrat held the White House. The excep-
tional 16-seat southern shift to the GOP in 1994, consti-
tuted more seats than Republicans had gained in the three
previous Democratic mid-terms combined. GOP gains were
also out-of-line with expectations from retirement slumps,
that had generally worked against Republican gains
(Gilmour and Rothstein 1993; Gaddie 1997).
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1 Jimmy Carter carried his home state, Georgia, in 1980. Otherwise, the
South voted consistently for GOP presidential nominees during the
1980s. The South is defined as the eleven secession states.
NOTE: An earlier version of this study was presented at the annual meet-
ing of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August
28-September 1, 2002. The data used in this analysis were pro-
vided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research which bears no responsibility for the interpretations pre-
sented here.
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The 1994 seat shift stemmed from a remarkable change
in the voting behavior of white southerners. For years,
Democrats had attracted a fairly consistent share of the vote
in southern House elections. According to exit polls, Demo-
cratic congressional candidates averaged 49 percent support
among whites from 1980-92 (New York Times 1992). Across
those seven elections, Democratic success ranged from a
high of 55 percent in 1982 to a low of 45 percent of the
white vote in 1984. The success in 1982 was an outlier with
the other six elections showing white support between 45
and 50 percent. Exit poll estimates showed Democrats get-
ting at least half the white vote in mid-term elections when
Republicans held the White House but averaging 47 percent
in presidential years, and they did no better in Clinton’s ini-
tial election than the average for the three Republican pres-
idential successes. 
ANES data in Figure 1 show Democrats performing
better than in exit polls among southern white voters during
the 1980-1992 period. In none of these seven elections did
a majority of southern white voters support Republicans for
Congress. Support for GOP nominees ranged from a low of
32.2 percent in 1988 to a high of 48.4 percent in 1992. The
average level of white support for Democrats during this
period was a comfortable 59.6 percent. 
Despite frequent differences prior to 1992, ANES and
exit poll estimates agree that 1994 was disastrous for south-
ern Democrats. Exit polls reported that Democrats managed
just 35 percent of the white vote, a level of success (failure)
matched in 1996, 1998, and 2000. The 1994 collapse in
white support for Democratic congressional candidates put
it on par with that of their party’s presidential candidates
since 1980. In 1992, Bill Clinton attracted 34 percent of the
southern white vote in a three-way contest, only two points
above Michael Dukakis’ showing in 1988. Even the flame
out of the Perot meteor in 1996 did little to propel southern
whites toward the Democratic party as just 36 percent of
them backed Clinton’s re-election bid. The ANES approxi-
mates the exit poll figures and shows Democratic nominees
reduced to 35.8 percent in 1994. ANES data show the
Democrats’ disastrous collapse continued for the balance of
the decade. About 64 percent of whites cast GOP congres-
sional ballots in 1996, and in 1998 and 2000 the GOP share
of white ballots surged toward 70 percent. 
PARTISAN INCONSISTENCY
The uncanny ability of Democratic congressional nomi-
nees to retain their positions and even to pass seats on to
successors has triggered journalistic comment and scholarly
research. From a study of six special elections held across
the South in the 1980s and 1990s, James Glaser (1996) con-
cludes that Democrats recruited better candidates. How-
ever, Gaddie and Bullock (2000) find that candidate experi-
ence actually militated against Republican success in open
seats in the South in 1994, underscoring the limits of the
recruitment hypothesis in explaining GOP gains. Also the
ideological contrast between candidates for southern House
seats tended to be less stark than in presidential elections
where a liberal Democrat often faced a conservative Repub-
lican. Congressional contests often featured a conservative
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Democrat opposed by an even more conservative Republi-
can. As Black and Black (1987) observe, Democrats have
been difficult to dislodge when they run moderate conser-
vatives or conservative moderates. 
Explanations not unique to the South may also help
account for the halting progress made by the GOP. Perhaps
some southern voters, like those in other regions, favored
Republican presidential candidates because of their eco-
nomic conservativism and national defense postures while
supporting Democrats for Congress because of their ability
to secure benefits for the district (Jacobson 1990). 
Regardless of the explanation, until 1994, many southern
white voters distinguished between Democratic congres-
sional and presidential candidates. Recently that distinction
has mattered for far fewer voters. Figure 2 illustrates the inci-
dence of ticket splitting. In 1988, fully one-third of the
southern, white electorate cast a ballot for Bush for president
but a Democrat for the House. By 1996, however, the ticket-
splitting tendencies had declined dramatically and
accounted for fewer than one voter in ten. The figure also
shows partisan inconsistency in off-years, as determined by
ANES asking respondents who they supported in the previ-
ous presidential election, that tracks closely with split ticket
incidence in recent presidential elections. 
RESEARCH DESIGN
As a first step toward understanding the massive drop in
support for Democratic House candidates among white
voters, we identify the components of the southern electorate
that experienced the greatest shift toward the GOP. We con-
sider demographic characteristics of white southern voters
such as gender, income level, education, and age. We also
examine behavioral characteristics including partisan iden-
tification and ideology. We explore the impact of attitudinal
factors associated with the evaluation of candidates and
issues. These factors include both congressional and presi-
dential approval, health care and racial policy attitudes, as
well as opinions about Christian fundamentalists and
homosexuals serving in the military. 
Who?
Gender differences in voting behavior have plagued
Republican efforts in recent years with men more likely than
women to support Republicans. The GOP surge in 1994 has
been attributed to mobilization of angry white males. Exit
polls challenge that interpretation since they showed 68
percent of the region’s white males but also 59 percent of the
women backing the GOP in House contests (Balz and
Brownstein 1996: 208). Alternatives that could account for
the growth in GOP support witnessed in 1994 are (1) both
genders move toward the GOP at similar rates thereby
maintaining existing gender differences or (2) the gender
gap shrank as southern white women became more Repub-
lican in 1994 while their brothers, fathers, and sons
changed little in their partisan preferences. Miller and
Shanks (1996) observed that the trend of white southern
females toward the GOP arrested in 1980, while the men
kept going toward the GOP. 
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE WHITE SOUTHERN CONGRESSIONAL VOTE 233
 FIGURE 2
PERCENT OF TOTAL WHITE VOTE WHERE BALLOT WAS SPLIT (REPUBLICAN PRESIDENT/DEMOCRATIC HOUSE CANDIDATE)
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
YEAR
40
30
20
10
0
%
 O
F
TO
TA
L
VO
TE
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016prq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Class is a second element that has frequently differenti-
ated partisans, with Republicans having greater appeal
among the better educated and more affluent. The GOP in
the South has striven to shake its country club image, and
where it has succeeded it attracts support from a wide range
of income and education groups. Senator Jesse Helms (R-
NC), who ran especially well among the “Jessecrats” in the
tobacco-growing eastern part of his state, won over blue-
collar workers. Did the southern Democrats’ collapse result
from the migration of downscale whites to the GOP so as to
mute class differences in voting behavior? Exit polls suggest
that working class voters who have been a Democratic
mainstay nationwide shifted to the GOP in the South in
1994 (Balz and Brownstein 1996: 347). If this is accurate
then the relationship between income and support for
Republicans may be weakening as the GOP attracts lower
income voters. 
Education is another indicator of class that has been
linked to partisan voting in the South. While the earliest
GOP breakthroughs in the South came among the college
educated, Aistrup (1989) recognized Republican efforts
among the less well educated. These efforts paid dividends
as less educated whites have become increasingly likely to
vote for the GOP (Black and Black 1987: 246-249; Nadeau
and Stanley 1992). 
Some scholars identify generational replacement as a
major source of Republican growth in the South (Beck
1977; Farah and Norpoth 1986; Stanley 1988; Nadeau and
Stanley 1992). While younger voters have become more
supportive of GOP candidates, their parents, and especially
their grandparents, hesitated to forsake the party of their
ancestors. Young voters, who grew up with Ronald Reagan
as their image of the chief executive and their sole first-hand
recollection of a Democrat in the White House being the
failed presidency of Jimmy Carter, often provided enthusi-
astic support for Republican candidates up and down the
ticket. Older southern voters proved more reliable Democ-
rats, either because of recollections of Franklin Roosevelt or
Harry Truman, or because of personal ties to incumbent
Democratic officeholders for state and local offices. Several
studies see a weakening of generational differences begin-
ning with the Reagan era (Black and Black 1987: 246-44).
Petrocik (1987) reports few or no generational differences in
the patterns of partisan change in the South. The old as well
as the young are becoming Republicans. Wolfinger and
Hagen (1985) and Parker (1988) also observe a decline
during the 1980s in differences across generations in sup-
port for the GOP. To be explored here is whether any age
groups shifted dramatically to the GOP in 1994 or whether
various groups moved at similar rates. 
Voters who identify with neither party provide another
possible source of GOP support. Political scientists have
found that the growth of southern independents resulted
from conservative whites abandoning the Democratic Party.
The GOP targeted southern independents. Did independ-
ents break more heavily for the GOP in the South in 1994
than previously, while partisans remained loyal to their
standard bearer? Or, did Republicans display greater loyalty
in 1994 than in previous years? Or, is it possible that large
numbers of Democrats defected? A potential explanation for
the jump in GOP support that requires neither greater loy-
alty among Republicans nor disloyalty among Democrats
would be that Republican identifiers increased.
Moderates are another group more likely to shift toward
the GOP in 1994. Since in most districts the Democratic
nominee is more liberal than the Republican, liberals will
vote Democratic while conservatives support Republicans.
Moderate voters are more likely to split their tickets than are
their peers who ideologically are less centric (Fiorina 1988;
Hill 1991). 
Why? 
The Republican’s Contract with America emphasized
changes that Newt Gingrich (R-GA) promised would be ini-
tiated quickly if Republicans won a majority. Embedded in
these promises were criticisms of the House that had been
run by Democrats for 40 years. The trick for Gingrich was to
make the Democratic Congress the fall guy and expand the
negative evaluations about Congress to encompass Democ-
ratic incumbents. To achieve this end it would be necessary
to overcome the dichotomy in which voters distrust the insti-
tution but love their representative (Fenno 1975). 
GOP efforts to nationalize the campaign involved lashing
southern Democrats in Congress to their more liberal lead-
ers. While conservative and moderate Democrats had con-
tinued to win elections in the South, liberals encountered
difficulty triggered by federal enforcement of civil rights
(Black and Black 2002). Voters convinced that their local
Democratic nominee was cut from the national liberal mold
are more likely to vote Republican (Black and Black 1987;
Glaser 1996). 
A second aspect of nationalizing congressional cam-
paigns focused on President Clinton and his wife to person-
alize claims that the government was not working as it
should and had become not only ineffective but too intru-
sive. The “Clinton factor” provided an overlay to the phe-
nomenon that midterm House elections, often viewed as
referenda on presidential performance, usually result in the
president’s party losing seats. Retrospective evaluations of
the president, impacted by his deficit reduction plan and
accompanying tax increases, gun control, health care
reform, and the strength of the president’s previous election
all affect the scope of his party’s midterm loss (see also
Campbell 1997). Earlier Mann and Wolfinger (1980)
observed that the small defections among Democrats who
disapproved of President Carter’s performance could
account for changes in the partisan vote between 1976 and
1978. During his first term, President Clinton’s approval rat-
ings in the South were often ten points lower than in other
regions. Presidential job approval is examined as a possible
correlate of congressional voting.
Health care reform and the way in which the administra-
tion’s proposals had been mishandled proved particularly
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troubling for President Clinton and his party in 1994. The
product, inextricably linked to Hillary Clinton, was widely
criticized and ridiculed by partisan foes and special interests
such as medical practitioners and the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Fall campaign advertising and Republican candidate
speaking points emphasized the Clintons’ effort to bring
one-seventh of the nation’s economy under government
control. The traditional resistance of the South to intrusive
regulation and large government programs may have helped
fuel the anti-Democratic backlash. 
The ANES in several years of the 1990s included a ques-
tion that measured health policy attitudes. Respondents
were asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale, ranging
from the most liberal support for a government insurance
plan to the most conservative support of private insurance
plans. Liberal opinion will be classified as responses 1 and
2, conservative opinion as 6 and 7, and moderate opinion
as a response of 3, 4, or 5.2
Attitudes touching on race relations have been at or near
the surface of southern politics for decades. V. O. Key (1949)
argued that at the core of the region’s politics lay the “Negro
question.” Race is often cited as a continuing factor that
structures white southern voting behavior (Giles and Buck-
ner 1995). Sundquist (1983) notes that perceived Democra-
tic support for affirmative action programs helped GOP can-
didates in the South. Black and Black (1992) disentangle this
phenomenon. Their analysis of white voting for president
concludes that the shift of southern whites away from the
Democratic Party and ultimately toward the GOP is a prod-
uct of southern economic conservatism, combined with con-
cerns about the role of blacks in the community. Major fed-
eral programs to help the poor—disproportionately blacks in
the South—are difficult for some conservative southerners to
accept. Making governmental aid to blacks more trouble-
some for some southerners was the protracted struggle sur-
rounding redistricting in states where majority-minority dis-
tricts were drawn after the 1990 census.
To tap white racial attitudes, we use a question found on
every ANES since 1980 that provides a 7-point scale on
which the most liberal option is “government should make
every effort to help blacks” and the conservative anchor is
“government should make no special effort to help blacks.”
Dividing responses into liberal (a response of 1-2), moder-
ate (3-5) or conservative (response of 6-7), reveals partisan
divisions on racial issues. Every year the Republican con-
gressional vote has been higher among racial conservatives
than racial liberals.3
We also examine feelings regarding Christian fundamen-
talists. The South has historically been one of the most
traditionally religious regions of the country and the
nation’s largest Protestant denomination, the evangelical
Southern Baptist Convention is rooted there (Guth 1996:
147). Exit polls show Christian fundamentalists to be the
core GOP constituency in the South (Black and Black 2002)
and attitudes about this group are related to support for
Republican nominees. The ANES has frequently used a feel-
ing thermometer on Christian fundamentalists to measure
respondents’ attitudes in this area. 
Finally, we examine attitudes on homosexuals serving in
the military. As a presidential candidate, Clinton pledged to
address the ban on gays in the military and sought to do so
in the first month of his presidency. Clinton, however, was
forced to compromise on this issue and was not able to
simply lift the ban. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) played a key
role in the resulting “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy (Wigton
1996: 477). Being home to a disproportionate number of
military installations, this issue reverberated in the South
unlike in any other region of the United States. In the
1990s, the ANES began asking respondents whether they
believe homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the
armed forces.
FINDINGS
Compared to previous years, GOP support in 1994
increases dramatically in many categories. After 1994,
Republicans attracted broad-based support among white
voters in the South; Republican support that has been con-
solidated and sustained through the end of the decade. In
1994 about 64 percent of the region’s white voters reported
backing the GOP House nominee, a jump of almost 16 per-
centage points over the previous election. By 2000, 70 per-
cent of white southerners reported they voted for a GOP
congressional candidate. 
Beginning in 1994, white southerners’ presidential and
congressional voting became more consistent in terms of
partisanship as they reconciled partisan identification, ide-
ology, and vote choice. Under these circumstances, indica-
tors that previously acted independent of ideology or parti-
sanship will instead affect the vote via ideology and
partisanship. 
Gender
In 1990, women were 26 points more likely to vote
Democratic in congressional races; by 1992, the gender gap
had closed to one point with fewer than half of white males
voting Republican. A sizable jump in GOP support occurred
for both sexes in 1994. Despite an almost ten-point gender
gap in 1994, the election marks the first time that a major-
ity of both men and women supported Republican House
candidates. In every election thereafter, both genders give a
substantial majority of their vote to the GOP. The gender
gap shrinks to a mere one point in 1996 and three points
in1998 (when more women than men vote Republican). A
nine-point gap returns in 2000. 
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2 In the 2000 NES the scale was collapsed into a five-point one. The cor-
responding measures are: responses of 1 and 2 are the most conserva-
tive, responses of 3 are moderate, and responses of 4 and 5 are the most
liberal.
3 In 2000 the NES changed this item to a scale of five. For that year,
responses of 1or 2 will be liberal, 3 will be moderate, and 4 or 5 will be
conservative.
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 TABLE 1
REPUBLICAN SUPPORT AMONG CATEGORIES OF WHITE CONGRESSIONAL VOTERS IN THE SOUTH, 1980-2000
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Total 40.3 42.0 42.3 35.8 32.2 41.7 48.4 64.2 62.8 68.4 70.8
Men 36.4 37.5 46.2 44.6 39.2 54.5 48.8 69.5 63.5 67.5 76.1
Women 54.9 46.3 39.3 29.5 26.1 28.8 47.8 59.8 62.5 70.2 66.7
Family Income
<$15,000 — — — — — — 32.2 52.4 51.5 37.5 71.4
$15-24,999 — — — — — — 38.1 22.7 37.1 44.4* 73.7
$25-49,999 — — — — — — 54.9 63.2 65.6 69.6 56.5
$50,000 > — — — — — — 63.4 80.0 73.1 83.0 78.3
Education
Not H.S. Grad 21.6 25.0 32.7 18.2 21.1 35.2 28.1 31.6 34.8 55.6* 63.6
H.S. Grad 54.0 40.0 43.4 28.9 30.4 34.2 44.8 58.5 54.5 60.0 73.2
Some College 32.5 40.0 48.1 53.3 35.3 52.2 56.3 64.3 68.8 65.4 73.5
College Grad 36.4 61.1 44.4 36.4 39.1 42.3 57.6 76.7 73.8 81.8 71.7
Postgraduate 56.0 41.0 44.4 42.9 37.5 63.6 40.0 68.6 70.3 81.8 58.8
Age
18-29 27.3 55.0 40.4 30.0 24.2 30.0 50.0 65.0 57.1 53.8 80.0
30-44 52.9 50.0 41.0 42.9 36.4 45.7 54.0 69.1 69.6 83.3 69.6
45-64 32.7 38.3 46.3 39.5 35.5 52.3 45.8 66.1 61.7 70.3 71.0
65 and over 42.2 31.4 40.8 25.6 25.0 30.3 38.5 54.5 57.9 58.3 64.5
Democrats 27.1 22.4 25.0 10.0 18.2 20.7 16.7 22.9 28.0 34.3 36.4
Republicans 64.2 70.0 65.7 57.1 56.3 74.0 77.1 91.6 89.2 93.2 89.3
Independents 70.0 56.8 45.7 45.8 25.8 48.9 51.0 74.6 65.7 77.8 65.5
Liberals 19.0 40.0 37.0 12.5 16.7 43.4 27.1 17.9 26.8 30.0* 41.9
Moderates 31.9 40.0 29.2 27.0 21.4 40.0 50.8 58.1 50.0 66.7 63.6
Conservatives 51.8 55.9 58.0 50.9 40.3 50.0 67.3 83.9 82.7 88.0 84.0
Presidential Job Approval
Approve 23.7** 62.8 54.0 47.1 40.0 48.4 63.8 37.5** 45.5** 56.09** 53.3**
Disapprove 45.5 19.4 14.9 14.9 16.1 27.0 31.4 80.8 86.8 86.5 86.4
Congressional Approval
Approve 38.5 39.7 37.2 31.3 27.7 44.7 31.0 41.8 65.4 78.0 73.9
Disapprove 39.3 47.5 50.5 43.9 43.1 45.0 54.7 72.3 57.0 59.6 67.1
Health Policy
Govt 
Guarantee — — — — — — 27.0 36.1 42.1 — 65.5
Private
Insurance — — — — — — 58.3 84.6 86.4 — 77.3
Somewhere 
Between — — — — — — 56.9 61.8 58.7 — 66.7
Attitude about Government
Aid to Blacks
Make every effort to help 0.0* 15.4* 37.5 12.5* 9.1* 9.1* 15.8* 50.0* 44.4* 27.3* 33.3*
No special effort to help 41.5 43.1 53.3 35.0 40.8 45.3 57.9 74.7 80.8 94.1 78.7
Something between 43.8 50.0 40.1 38.6 19.5 49.1 45.1 60.6 52.4 67.4 64.5
Homosexuals in the
Armed Forces?
Yes — — — — — — 38.1 53.2 56.6 — 63.3
No — — — — — — 60.0 82.1 73.7 — 87.0
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016prq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Income Level
Enthusiasm for Gingrich’s minions in 1994 did not spread
equally across economic groups. Only whites whose annual
family incomes exceeded $25,000 gave strong support to
Republicans. In contrast, almost three in four voters in the
$15,000 - $24,999 category went Democratic, while Republi-
cans held their own among the poorest group taking roughly
half the vote. The largest increase in GOP support from 1992
to 1994 come among the poorest whites. By the end of the
decade, more than 70 percent of those making less than
$25,000 supported GOP congressional candidates and all
income categories in 2000 give majority support to the GOP. 
Education Level
Table 1 indicates that in 1988, no education level
awarded even 40 percent of its congressional vote to the
GOP. By 1998, all education categories gave majority sup-
port to Republicans. Increased GOP support in 1994 came
in all but the least educated category. In 1994, except for the
best-educated whites, the longer one had been in school the
more likely to vote Republican. Only high school dropouts
preferred Democrats, and this group made up less than a
tenth of the electorate. By 2000, the best educated were the
least likely to vote Republican, though a majority still sup-
ported the GOP. 
Age Cohorts
Since 1988 all age groups have become more supportive
of Republicans. The youngest voters tripled their support
from 1988-2000 while other age groups at least doubled
their support of the GOP during the same time period.
Republican strength reached unprecedented levels among
all age groups in 1994 and, in an across-the-board increase,
for the first time, captured majorities of all four age groups
in Table 1. The most supportive voters were the Baby
Boomers 30 to 44 years old, more than two-thirds of whom
voted Republican. Even the oldest group, those most likely
to remember the Solid Democratic South, gave Republicans
a 4:3 advantage. In subsequent elections, GOP candidates
continued winning a majority of all age groups.
Partisanship
Republicans in 1994 received near unanimous support
(91.6 percent) from voters who identified with the GOP.
Republicans had never been more united in casting party-line
ballots for the House. The 1994 uptick in GOP support
among Independents (23.6 points) outpaced that of Republi-
can identifiers. Democratic identifiers maintained a high level
of support for their own party candidates with more than 75
percent voting for their party’s nominee in 1994. This sup-
port, however, represents a six-point shift toward GOP can-
didates from the previous election. In subsequent elections,
Republican candidate support from Republican identifiers
oscillated between 89 percent and 93 percent, while between
65 percent and 78 percent of Independents cast GOP ballots.
In the last three elections about one-third of white Democra-
tic Party identifiers balloted for the GOP.
GOP candidates reaped a sizable increase in support
from Independents and also improved their performance
with Republicans in the 1994 elections and after. Support
from Democrats also increased, but less than from Indepen-
dents and Republicans. The choices made by Independents
were almost equidistant between identifiers with the two
parties in 1990 and 1992, but since 1994 they have voted
much more like Republicans than Democrats. 
Ideology
Ideology was not unrelated to vote choice in 1990 but
became strongly related in 1992 and strengthened in 1994
as conservatives became more committed to the GOP and
liberals united in supporting Democrats. Moderates, whose
voting behavior had often been almost indistinguishable
from that of liberals in the 1980s, swung toward the GOP in
1994. Prior to 1992, conservatives had never cast more than
60 percent of their votes for a Republican and moderates
had not exceeded 40 percent GOP support. In 1994,
Republicans drew the votes of 84 percent of the conserva-
tives and 58 percent of the moderates.
Democratic candidates polled especially well among liber-
als, getting about 80 percent of their votes in 1994. The prob-
lem faced by Democrats was that only one in six white south-
erners fell into the liberal category. By contrast, more than
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TABLE 1 (continued)
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Feeling Thermometer—
Christian Fundamentalists
0-49 — — — — — — 41.9 51.9 59.7 55.6 66.0
50-69 — — — — — — 51.2 67.7 63.0 78.6 64.3
70-84 — — — — — — 45.0 55.2 59.4 71.4 86.4
85-100 — — — — — — 54.7 74.6 71.4 70.0 100.0
Data were obtained from various National Election Studies from 1980-2000.
*Fewer than five respondents in cell.
**Democratic presidents
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sixty percent of the southern white electorate classified itself
as conservative. Moderates, who outnumbered liberals by 50
percent, went for Republicans by a 3:2 margin. The GOP
advantage among moderates lapsed in1996, though the falloff
of moderate GOP ballots was in part compensated by an
increase in liberals casting GOP votes. In 2000, most white
moderates disappeared from the ANES (only 7.1 percent of
identifiers), leaving a predominantly conservative southern
white electorate that votes Republican (five times in six), and
a minority of liberals who vote Democratic for Congress
(three times in five). Overall, if one estimates the proportion
of all ballots cast in 2000, 55 percent of southern congres-
sional votes were conservatives casting GOP ballots, while
only 16 percent were liberals casting Democratic ballots.4 
The relationship between respondent perceptions of the
ideological position of congressional candidates and voting
changed. Black and Black (1986) suggested that Democrats
continued to win southern congressional seats by portray-
ing themselves as moderates or conservatives. Of the
respondents willing to assign an ideological label to Demo-
cratic candidates in 1990, three-fifths saw them as moder-
ate or conservative and Democrats ran well with these
voters. Four years later, more than half the voters saw their
Democratic nominee as liberal and fewer than one in five
pinned the conservative label on the Democrat. In 1994,
southern whites’ voting decisions were strongly linked to
their perception of the Democrat’s ideology with Democrats
running well among voters who believed them to be con-
servative but rejected by a 3:2 margin by voters who saw
them as liberal. In contrast, no relationship existed between
voters’ perceptions of the ideological placement of Republi-
can nominees and willingness to cast ballots for them.
While three-fourths of the Republican candidates were seen
as conservative (and 77 percent of these voters backed the
Republican), even voters who perceived the GOP nominee
to be moderate or liberal cast more than two of three ballots
for the Republican.
Congressional and Presidential Approval
A variety of recent political science studies reveal that the
general approval of the institution of Congress affects vote
choice (Finocchiaro, 2003). This is a change from previous
expectations (i.e, Fenno 1975) which find a degree of inde-
pendence between the love for congressmen and the hatred
for Congress. Attitudes about Congress relate strongly to
1994 voting behavior. Democrats corralled almost 60 percent
of the vote of those who approved of Congress while more
than 70 percent of the critics tried to elect a Republican. The
impact of attitudes about Congress shifted dramatically from
1990 to 1994. In 1990, roughly the same number of those
approving and disapproving of Congress’s performance gave
their vote to GOP congressional candidates. In 1992, those
who disapproved of Congress were 24 points more likely to
vote GOP; by 1994, the disapproving/approving gap was 31
points The phenomenon of majority support for Democrats,
regardless of how Congress was evaluated persisted through-
out the period of Democratic dominance in Table 1 save for
1984 when critics voted Republican by the narrowest margin.
The 23.7 point difference in voting patterns registered in
1992 was among the largest when Democrats ruled the
House and in retrospect was a precursor for 1994 when dis-
approval became very strongly associated with a Republican
vote. More recently a majority of those who approve and
those who disapprove of Congress vote for the GOP although
Republicans do somewhat better among voters holding posi-
tive evaluations. Gingrich and the Republicans succeeded in
capitalizing on disapproval of Congress in 1994.
The congressional preferences of southern whites has
been related to evaluations of presidential performance with
Republicans running best among critics when a Democrat
occupied the White House and with the pattern reversing
during the tenure of a Republican chief executive. Thus it
was expected that Clinton critics would be more likely to
vote for Republican congressional candidates in 1994. Con-
tributing to the GOP surge were three in eight Clinton fans
who nonetheless voted Republican along with four-fifths of
those who evaluated the president negatively. The remark-
able cohesion of Clinton’s foes persisted throughout his
presidency but the relationship between evaluations of his
job performance and congressional voting weakened as
even most of his backers supported Republicans for Con-
gress by 1998.
Policy Issues
The three policy areas examined also sort out House
voting preferences in expected ways. Health care assumed
special significance in light of the Clinton proposal to
expand coverage to millions lacking health insurance and
the harsh reaction that torpedoed the plan. The distinction
on the health care issue was especially striking as Republi-
cans got a third of the vote among those who favored gov-
ernment-guaranteed health care in 1994 while attracting
more than twice that level of support from among voters
who favored private insurance and the jump in GOP sup-
port came chiefly from the latter group. This same pattern is
also present in 1996, but by 2000 Republican congressional
candidates are carrying nearly two-thirds support across all
dimensions of the health issue.
Given the unique role of race in southern politics (Key
1949), the second policy area considered involved govern-
ment assistance for African Americans. Very few southern
whites favored aggressive government efforts on behalf of
blacks. The 1994 congressional elections saw GOP support
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4 In 2000, the proportion of congressional ballots, by ideology, is as fol-
lows: Liberal voting Republican: 11.7 percent; Moderate voting Republi-
can: 4.5 percent; Conservative voting Republican: 54.5 percent; Liberal
voting Democratic: 16.2 percent; Moderate voting Democratic: 2.6 per-
cent; Conservative voting Democratic: 10.4 percent. There are about the
same number of Republican-voting Liberals as Democratic-voting Con-
servatives. Republicans still have a 2:1 advantage among the small class
of moderates.
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rise among voters regardless of their attitudes about efforts
to aid blacks. The level of Republican support among racial
conservatives in 1994 (74.7 percent) resembled the level of
support for Reagan and Bush by racial conservatives in
1980, 1984, and 1988 (68.2 percent, 74.6 percent, and
70.7 percent, respectively). Racial conservatives voted more
heavily Republican for the House in1994 than for president
in 1992 (59.9 percent), or 1996 (67 percent). By 2000,
racial conservative voting behavior for Republican House
and presidential candidates still favored congressional can-
didates but was only separated by about 6 points (78.7 and
72.9, respectively).
Disaffection with congressional Democrats ran deeper
than the fundamental, underlying issues of race. Racial
moderates start moving toward the Republican party earlier.
From 1980-1988 Republican congressional candidates
pulled an average of 38.6 percent of the racial moderate
vote. This jumped to 49.1 percent in 1990, 48.3 percent in
1992, and 60.6 percent in 1994.
The final policy issue considered is the status of homo-
sexuals in the military, an issue that came to the forefront in
the 1990s. Those responding that they did not favor allow-
ing homosexuals to serve in the military gave strong major-
ity support to Republican House candidates. In 1992, the
first year the question was asked, there was a clear pattern
with those favoring gays serving in the armed forces giving
62 percent of their support to Democratic House candidates
while those responding negatively support Republican
House candidates by a similar margin. Although in 1994,
both categories of respondents gave majority support to
Republican candidates, the gap between the two categories’
level of support is the largest at almost 30 points.
Fundamentalist Support
Voters with the most positive attitudes about Christian
fundamentalists, i.e., those who scored Christian funda-
mentalists at 85 or above on the 100 point feeling ther-
mometer, voted Republican by a 3:1 ratio in 1994 almost a
20 point increase over the previous year. Even those least
positive about fundamentalists, i.e., scores below 50, gave
Republicans half their ballots but had a smaller increase
from 1992. While the strength of this relationship varies for
the subsequent elections, by 2000 an even two-thirds of
those with negative feelings towards the Christian Right
pulled the GOP lever while the most strident supporters of
the Christian Right are uniform in their congressional pref-
erence for Republicans. 
1994: AN HISTORIC ELECTION
Only two categories in 1994, ideological liberals and
those with incomes of $15,000-$24,999, did not increase
their 1992 level of support for House Republican candi-
dates. In 1994 GOP backing in most categories of voters
reached historic highs. Those highs, however, would be sur-
passed for many in subsequent elections, especially 1998
and 2000, which further cemented GOP congressional sup-
port in the South. The increased support for GOP members
of the House of Representatives from 1994 to 2000 reflects,
to some extent the power of incumbency.
While Table 1 shows a general shift toward the GOP in
1994, not all categories moved sufficiently to account for
the more than 15-point Republican increase. Republicans
chalked up their greatest gains among those with a post-
graduate education (28.6 points), Independents (23.6
points), those holding conservative attitudes on health
policy (26.3 points), those disapproving of gays in the mil-
itary (22.1 points), men (20.7 points), the lowest income
category (20.2 points), and those aged 45-64 (20.3 points).
Thus, GOP congressional nominees made headway among
groups that one would expect to favor the party such as
those holding more conservative policy attitudes but they
also made advances among the key swing group of Inde-
pendents. They even improved their standing among the
lowest income category, often an important element of the
Democratic coalition.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
The descriptive analysis above indicated competing
explanations for the level of Republican congressional
voting in 1994. That analysis also indicated changes in the
potential predictors of congressional voting between 1992,
when Republicans won 50 southern seats, and 1994, when
they won 66 southern seats. It also illustrates the consolida-
tion of Republican voting among southern whites as con-
gressional voting behavior finally came into alignment with
presidential voting behavior. In 1992, a majority of white
southern voters were still casting ballots for Democratic
congressional nominees. By 1994, this long-standing pat-
tern was reversed.
The dependent variable in the multivariate analysis is the
vote for members of Congress, coded 1 if a voter chose a
Republican and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables
include all of the potentially significant predictors discussed
above, and fall into four categories: (1) personal political
behaviors, such as party identification and personal ideol-
ogy; (2) political—presidential and congressional evalua-
tions; (3) attitudinal variables about Christian fundamental-
ists, ideology, and issue positions such as on race relations,
health care, or gays in the military; and (4) personal charac-
teristics, such as gender, age, income, and education. The
description of the coding of each variable appears in the
Appendix. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous,
logistic regression is used.
As indicated in the first column of Table 2, congressional
votes of white southerners in 1992 were driven by party
identification and negative feelings on homosexuals serving
in the armed forces. By 1994, however, votes are solely
driven by partisan identification and feelings on gays serv-
ing in the military is no longer a driving factor. In fact,
although not statistically significant, the parameter is not in
the expected direction. The multivariate model verifies our
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suspicion that the 1994 vote was more than the backlash of
the angry white man as gender is not a significant predictor.
Nor were attitudes about health coverage or Christian fun-
damentalists significant factors in the congressional vote. In
the subsequent three elections, only party identification is
consistent as a predictor. 
What can we say from these models? The analysis indi-
cates that three of the myths of the 1994 election—the
angry white male backlash, the residual negative effects of
the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, and the Christian Coalition
mobilization—are less important than widely assumed. The
critical mobilization of 1994 was not men, those opposed to
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 TABLE 2
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF SOUTHERN WHITE CONGRESSIONAL VOTING
Variable 1992 1994a** 1994b** 1996 1998 2000
Constant –1.405 –11.957 –5.775 –8.991 –7.453 –3.770
Republican ID .409 (.135)* 1.627 (.517)* .755 (167)* .539 (.147)* .458 (.204)* .564 (.186)*
1.505 5.090 2.127 1.715 1.581 1.758
Christian Fund. –.011 (.010) .004 (.025) .006 (.010) .023 (.010) .001 (.016) .019 (.012)
.989 1.004 1.006 1.023 1.001 1.020
Conservative Ideology .105 (.198) .202 (.481) .251 (.246) .287 (.220) .017 (.384) -.046 (.236)
1.111 1.224 1.285 1.332 1.017 .955
Congressional Approval –.245 (.516) .176 (1.207) –.021 (.972) –.152 (.436) .952 (.789) –.014 (.551)
.783 1.192 .979 .859 2.590 .986
Pres. Job Approval .776 (.463) .153 (1.499) –.670 (.599) –.289 (.546) .245 (.929) -.110 (.742)
2.173 1.165 .512 .749 1.277 .895
Racial Assistance Conservativism .022 (.225) –.100 (.770) -.124 (.340) .233 (.265) 1.299 (.630)* .380 (.304)
1.022 .905 .884 1.263 3.665 1.463
Health Policy Conservativism .012 (.218) –.449 (.555) –.150 (.273) .199 (.282) — .020 (.221)
1.012 .638 .861 1.221 1.020
Gender .276 (.420) 2.706 (1.531) .580 (.547) .563 (.463) .148 (.719) -.029 (.596)
1.318 14.975 1.787 1.756 1.160 .972
Income .347 (.206) .744 (.520) .497 (.292) –.209 (.225) .371 (.400) –.040 (.270)
1.415 2.104 1.643 .812 1.449 .961
Education –.146 (.148) –.295 (.414) .050 (.184) .245 (.154) .292 (.277) .156 (.203)
.864 .745 1.051 1.278 1.339 1.169
Age –.015 (.014) .032 (.031) .013 (.016) .035 (.016)* –.026 (.024) .000 (.019)
.985 1.032 1.013 1.036 .975 1.0
Gays in Military –1.151 (.476)* .992 (1.630) — 1.061 (.552) — –.739 (.703)
.316 2.697 2.889 .478
Log-likelihood 66.837 55.482 93.567 80.752 36.685 43.620
Null Prediction 53.846 64.384 66.250 64.118 67.568 67.257
% Correct Prediction 76.923 89.041 85.000 80.588 82.432 79.646
PRE 50.000 69.230 55.556 45.900 45.831 37.837
Valid N 169 73 160 170 74 113
Standard errors in parentheses. Change in odds ratio below parameter estimates. An analysis of variance inflation factors for the independent variables
revealed no siginficant multicollinearity in the models for any of the years.
*p < .05
**The question regarding attitudes on homosexuals serving in the military in the 1994 ANES is from the 1993 pilot study and as such was not asked of all
respondents. The inclusion of this variable substantially reduces the number of cases available for analysiswith our model. A Chow test was conducted for
those with a response on this question and those without. F = 1.617; critical F(11,136) = 1.87.
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gays serving in the military, or those with positive feelings
regarding Christian fundamentalists. The critical factor in
the 1994 election was that the voters began behaving in a
way that corresponded with their party identification, some-
thing that southern white voters had not done consistently
down-ticket before the 1990s.
The balance of the 1990s is a story of partisan consoli-
dation aided by the lure of incumbency. Demographic pre-
dictors largely fail significance tests in predicting congres-
sional vote choice. Southern congressional elections have
become defined almost entirely in party terms for southern
whites by the end of the decade, and the party of choice is
the GOP.
CONCLUSIONS
The GOP triumph in 1994 was thought to be fueled by
angry white males and the Christian Right, both mobilized,
at least in part, by dissatisfaction over the change in policy
on the status of homosexuals serving in the armed forces. We
find little evidence of these factors being important predic-
tors of vote choice in that election. Specific issues of health
care reform and federal policy toward African Americans also
failed to be related to southern whites’ vote preferences, and
as others have found, these issues are far less important than
general ideology in explaining party identification. Those
factors do not show any persistent influence subsequent to
1994, although racial conservatism is significant in the 1998
elections. To the extent that issues drove the 1994 election,
an issue effect was likely through more generally held beliefs
acting through partisanship. The critical factor in 1994 was
white southerners finally voting in ways consistent with their
partisan identification of House candidates.
Party identification contributed to explaining congres-
sional voting patterns as Republican identifiers rallied to
GOP nominees in record numbers. The long-term effect was
to recast white congressional voting on a strong, partisan
dimension, free of secondary predictors. The structure of
the congressional electorate took on a coherent shape,
resembling the shape of the presidential vote. This relation-
ship is reflected in recent aggregate election results. George
W. Bush won all but five of the 73 congressional districts
that elected Republicans in 2000.5 Bush also carried 18 of
the 52 districts held by Democrats after November 2000.
Five of these districts are in the Deep South (AL-1, LA-7,
GA-2, MS-5, and SC-5) and another eight are in Texas (CDs
1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 11, 17, and 27). The remaining four are in
North Carolina (CDs 2 and 7), Tennessee (CD-6), and Vir-
ginia (CD-9). This is a stark contrast to the 1988 election, in
which the vast majority of southern congressional districts
turned in split decisions, despite a GOP sweep of the region.
This result is consistent with the aggregate analysis of
Southern GOP development by Hood, Kidd, and Morris
(2004: 90), in which the authors conclude that in the South,
“political factors begat political change.” 
How does one summarize the state of southern white
congressional voting in the 1990s? Across a variety of fac-
tors that historically distinguished Southern Republicanism,
whites are now overwhelmingly Republican in their con-
gressional voting behavior. The events of 1994 represent a
significant intervention in the southern electorate that pro-
pelled congressional and presidential preferences into closer
coherence along party and ideological lines. Then, through
the remainder of the decade, much of the southern, white
electorate converted to the GOP in congressional vote
choice. This conversion and stabilization of southern white
preferences is the endgame of the southern realignment, the
period in which party preferences drive partisan choices
and do so without significant caveat of the sort used to
excuse the previous state of partisan incoherence.
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APPENDIX.
VARIABLES AND CODING FOR THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Variable Coding
Republican Identification Respondent’s self-placement on a seven-point scale, where 1 is strong Democrat and 7 is
strong Republican (recode from v523 in 2000, v339 in 1998, v420 in 1996, v655 in 1994,
v3634 in 1992).
.
Christian Fundamentalism For 1992, 1994, 1996 and 2000: The respondent’s feeling thermometer for Christian Fun-
damentalists 1992 v5338, 1994 v315, 1996 v1038, 2000 v1317. For 1998: The respon-
dent’s feeling thermometer for Religious Right v263.
Conservative Ideology Respondent’s self-placement on a seven-point scale, where 1 is most liberal and 7 most
conservative (2000 v446; 1998 v399; 1996 v365; 1994 v839; 1992 v3509).
Congressional Approval 1 if the respondent approves of the performance of congress, 0 otherwise (recode from
v356 in 2000, v236 in 1998, v270 in 1996, v320 in 1994, v5949 in 1992)
5 Three of these districts were in Florida (CDs 10, 16, 22) and two were
in Virginia (CDs 4 and 11).
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